The economic analysis of corporate governance is in vogue. In addition to a host of theoretical papers, an increasing number of empirical studies analyze how ownership structure, capital structure, board structure, and the market for corporate control influence firm performance. This is not an easy task, and indeed, for reasons explained in this survey, empirical studies on corporate governance have more than the usual share of econometric problems. This paper is a critical survey of the recent empirical literature on corporate governance ± to show which methodological lessons can be learned for future empirical research in the field of corporate governance, paying particular attention to German institutions and data availability.
INTRODUCTION
Corporate governance is the complex system of control mechanisms supposed to influence management behavior in order to guarantee a high value of the owners' equity in the firm. Efficient corporate governance reduces the agency costs resulting from a divergence of interest between the owners and the managers of the firm (Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen and Meckling, 1976) .
Understanding corporate governance is important because these agency costs are potentially large, reducing firm productivity and, if widespread, the productivity of an entire country (Bo Èrsch-Supan, 1999) . The heated debate about the`Rhine model' versus the`Anglo-Saxon model' of governance (Porter, 1992; Jensen, 1993) remains unresolved. Unfortunately, theoretical analyses of corporate governance tend to deliver ambiguous answers because there are too many counteracting mechanisms which mask any clear picture (Hellwig, 1997) .
Empirical studies of corporate governance are supposed to shed light on the relative weight of these counteracting mechanisms. They usually regress some measure of performance, ideally the firm's equity value or total factor productivity, on measures of the stringency of corporate governance, such as ownership structure, capital structure, board structure, or the market for corporate control.
Unfortunately, this is not an easy task. For reasons explained in this survey, empirical studies on corporate governance have more than the usual share of econometric problems. Quite frequently, firm variables are assumed to be exogenous but are actually endogenous; the sample is not selected randomly; relevant variables are left out; and variables are measured with large errors. In all of these cases it will be difficult to isolate the influence of corporate governance factors on firm performance.
The aim of this paper is a critical survey of the recent empirical literature on corporate governance with an emphasis on the methodological lessons that can be learned for future empirical research in the field of corporate governance. We structure the paper according to four categories of econometric problems that have to be solved in order to infer causal effects of corporate governance: reverse causality, sample selectivity, missing variables, and measurement error in variables. In each section, we briefly describe the econometric problem in a textbook fashion and give examples drawing on the recent empirical literature. By synthesizing these examples we hope to develop a framework for future empirical studies on corporate governance with two purposes. First, the framework serves to detect the causes for potential estimation biases. Second, it provides suggestions how these problems can be avoided.
We are, of course, not the first who note that empirical studies on corporate governance tend to be subject to a host of econometric problems. A good example is the recent study of Himmelberg et al. (1999) who discuss in detail estimation biases resulting from reverse causality and sample selectivity problems. Our contribution is written as a survey with a broad coverage of econometric problems, an applied view in order to point out practical solutions to these problems and particular attention to the institutional setting in Germany.
Section 2 of this paper begins with the problem of reverse causality (or endogeneity). This problem is omnipresent because analyses of the efficacy of corporate control instruments on firm performance require that these instruments are exogenous. In practice, however, it is typical that a deterioration of firm performance precipitates changes in governance. In turn, well-performing firms attract investors with equally typical ownership structures and thus corporate governance.
Section 3 analyzes how sample selectivity affects the estimation of corporate governance mechanisms. Although often less familiar to the empirical researcher, this econometric problem is as frequent as it is serious because most empirical studies analyze only the largest and ± among them ± only the listed firms. Size and being listed is frequently a function of firm performance, inducing selectivity bias.
Section 4 addresses the problem of missing variables. This classical econometric problem has particularly interesting consequences in the case of an interaction of product market competition and corporate control mechanisms. We argue that product market competition and corporate governance are partial substitutes (i.e., bad corporate governance structures can be offset by fierce product market competition). Hence, an analysis of corporate governance without explicit consideration of product market competition produces misleading results.
Section 5 finishes our list of econometric problems with a discussion of typical measurement errors. Firm performance is hard to measure in practice, particularly during episodes of stress and corporate governance actions. A badly measured dependent variable weakens estimation results owing to a low signalto-noise ratio. On top of this, the usual proxy constructions for corporate governance variables reduce the estimated effects. Both effects contribute to the common but ± as we will argue ± incorrect conclusion that corporate governance mechanisms are overrated in their effect on productivity and firm performance.
These conclusions are summarized in Section 6, augmented by recommendations what can be done in practice to obtain better and more precise estimates of the efficacy of corporate governance.
REVERSE CAUSALITY
The core task of empirical studies on corporate governance is to explain firm performance by firm-specific variables that describe owner control. High monitoring costs between shareholders and managers can make owner control ineffective when the shares are dispersed (Grossman and Hart, 1980) , compared to a situation in which the shares are owned by only a few large shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986) . However, the direction of causality between ownership structure and performance is not clear: concentrated ownership can improve firm performance via better monitoring, but well-performing firms could also attract investors. This is an example of structural reverse causality. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that the lower the participation of management in the firm's equity, the higher the agency costs. High managerial ownership aligns the managers' incentives with the incentives of other shareholders (Convergence-of-Interest Hypothesis). Vice versa, managers could hold equity especially in highly profitable firms because this increases their wealth (Leland and Pyle, 1977) . Causality of ownership and performance is therefore not clear ex ante.
Similar problems arise when an unobserved variable simultaneously determines ownership and performance. This case of reverse causality is known as spurious correlation. To illustrate this, we borrow an example from Himmelberg et al. (1999) . Assume that there are two types of firms: firm A has a higher degree of market power than firm B. If competition has a disciplining effect on managerial decisions, closer monitoring is required for firm A. In consequence, managers of firm A might receive a relatively large fraction of equity to align their interests with those of the other shareholders. However, owing to market power firm A shows higher profit rates than firm B. Empirically, we would measure a positive correlation between managerial ownership and profitability. 1 But the estimated coefficient of managerial ownership will reflect only spurious correlation, not a causal relationship.
In these examples, the explanatory variable (ownership structure) is codetermined with the variable to be explained (performance). In econometrics-speak, the explanatory variable is endogenous. Without structural assumptions, the impact of this corporate governance mechanism on performance cannot be identified.
More formally, assume that the true model can be written as The second term can be evaluated by replacing x with the RHS of equation (2). We obtain covxY 4 covz Y 4 covx 4 Y 4 ' 2 4 covxY 4 ' 4 4
It follows that covxY 4 ' 2 4 ' 4 1 À If T 0 or ' 4 T 0, the estimated coefficient will be biased and inconsistent. The first is true in our first example of structural reverse causality, the second if 1.
Note that this effect depends on the measure of performance applied: ceteris paribus, profitability is likely to be higher in firms with market power but not necessarily productivity or productivity growth. For example, Januszewski et al. (2002) find a negative impact of market power on the growth of total factor productivity. common unobserved factors are present. In the latter case, the empirically measured correlation between x and z is only spurious. Since both cases are very likely, endogeneity is, in our view, the most serious problem in studies on corporate governance. The formal description in equations (1)±(4) is helpful in analyzing the problem. Suppose that poor performance leads to a takeover which results in higher ownership concentration. Assume further that the new owners replace management what in turn leads to improved performance. In terms of equations (1) and (2), is the impact of ownership concentration on performance and the impact of performance on ownership concentration. According to our assumptions, is positive and negative. If ' 4 0, we know that the covariance of x and 4 is negative. This implies that the impact of ownership concentration on performance is underestimated because we neglected the endogeneity of concentration.
Another good example for the endogeneity problem is the widely cited study of Demsetz and Lehn (1985) . They examine the effect of ownership concentration on a firm's average profit rate during the years 1976±80. Using cross-section data for 511 US firms, they investigate
Their central explanatory variable is A5, which denotes the equity share of the five largest shareholders. 2 As control variables they use expenditures for advertising and R&D, firm size, the standard deviation of accounting rates of return, and the standard deviation of market rates of return to proxy for the instability of a firm's environment as well as industry dummies. Their main result is that ownership concentration has a negative, although insignificant, impact on the firm's average profit rate. Demsetz and Lehn attribute this result to the endogeneity of ownership: shareholders deciding to alter the ownership structure from concentration to dispersion of shares should do so in awareness of its consequences for loosening control over professional management (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985) . Therefore, in their view, no relationship between ownership concentration and performance exists. The study of Demsetz and Lehn (1985) exemplifies the approach of a host of other empirical studies examining the influence of ownership on performance. Morck et al. (1988) regress firm value measured by Tobin's q on the fraction of shares owned by management using a cross-section of 371 US firms. The main problem with their approach is that their cross-sectional data cannot provide for instruments which are necessary to control for potential endogeneity of 2. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) also use alternative measures of management ownership such as the share owned by the top 20 shareholders or a Herfindahl index which measures ownership concentration.
ownership. In the same manner, McConnell and Servaes (1990) use a sample of 1,173 US firms. In contrast to Morck et al. (1988) they have intertemporal variation in their data because they use two sets of cross-sectional data. Being aware of the problem of potential spurious correlation, they determine the robustness of results by adjusting all variables for their industry mean. However, McConnell and Servaes do not investigate the problem of structural reverse causality ± probably owing to the lack of valid instruments. Leech and Leahy (1991) use a sample of 470 listed UK firms. They directly address the problem of endogeneity by regressing ownership structure on firm age, firm size, and a measure of firm-specific risk. But there remain two problems with their approach. First, they do not explain performance and ownership structure simultaneously. Second, their explanatory variables are also likely to be endogenous. Thus they cannot avoid reverse causality.
Compelling evidence for an endogeneity problem created by unobserved common factors to both RHS and LHS variables is presented by Himmelberg et al. (1999) . This example is particularly helpful because it shows that panel data are extremely important in getting rid of this second cause of endogeneity. To solve the endogeneity problem Himmelberg et al. use data from 1982±92 to assemble an unbalanced panel with about 600 US firms. They explain the level of managerial ownership m it with
where x it are observable and u it unobservable firm characteristics. Assuming that the unobservable firm characteristics u it u i are constant over time, they calculate pooled and fixed-effect estimators. In the pooled regression, managerial ownership is explained by expenditures for R&D and advertisements, firm size, and firm's idiosyncratic risk. Then they calculate several variants of fixed-effect estimators, and most coefficients change sign or become insignificant while the adjusted R 2 rises significantly. This suggests that in the pooled OLS regression the error term is correlated with explanatory variables leading to biased coefficients. Short (1994) provides an excellent survey of further empirical studies. She concludes that most studies are limited by the use of cross-sectional data because only panel data allow to fully capture the dynamic interactions of firmspecific variables.
Tests
The classical test for causality in panel data models goes back to Granger (1969) . 3 The idea is simple: in terms of equation (1), if x causes z, then changes in x should precede changes in z. To say that, two conditions must hold. First, in a regression of z on past values of z, the addition of past values of x should 3.
For earlier tests, see Anderson and Rubin (1949) and Koopmans and Hood (1953) . and use the residuals from both equations to perform an F-test. The test should reject that the -coefficients are jointly zero; and in a second step where we regress z on x, the respective coefficients should jointly be zero. To take into account that another factor y might be causing z, and y might be contemporaneously correlated with x, lagged values of y are included.
Lessons
Theoretical considerations and empirical evidence show that no conclusions about the impact of any corporate governance mechanism on firm performance can be made without considering the problem of reverse causality. Two things can be learned for future empirical research:
• Use panel data. Cross-sectional data do not allow to correct for unobserved firm heterogeneity. Panel data are a necessary condition for the identification of any singular corporate governance mechanism because panel data can provide for instruments that are not available in crosssectional data. • Take the unobserved into account. When unobserved firm characteristics are correlated with the exogenous variables, estimated coefficients will be biased. Estimating fixed-effect models or models in first differences can help to solve this problem. However, when the unobserved firm characteristics are not constant over time, this econometric trick does not work because firm effects cannot be subtracted out of the specification (e.g. by calculating first differences). The only way out is to reduce the unobserved part of our model and to collect time-series information on all relevant firm-specific variables.
More formally, consider the following data-generating process:
ß Verein fu È r Socialpolitik and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2002 where 4 Ã it is independently and identically distributed with mean zero and variance ' 2 4 . Furthermore, we suspect that x it is endogenous with respect to y it . In order to consistently estimate model (9), we need instrumental variables that are correlated with x it but are uncorrelated with y it . For panel data, values of x it lagged j periods are such instruments, provided the following conditions hold:
While the second condition is likely to hold, for example because economic variables typically show some degree of persistence, the first condition is more problematic. In particular, when the true error structure is given by 4 Ã it i 4 it , i.e. when the error term contains a firm-specific effect i , which is constant for all t, and i is correlated with x it , this condition does not hold. One solution to this problem of unobserved heterogeneity is to eliminate the individual effects by transforming the data to deviations from individual means, which is possible with panel data. We obtain
where the bars indicate means. The estimator obtained from this transformation is often called the within estimator or fixed-effects estimator. It can be shown that this estimator has the interpretation of an instrumental variables estimator where each explanatory variable is instrumented by its value in deviation from the individual-specific mean (e.g., Verbeek, 2000) . However, if the explanatory variable x it is not strictly exogenous, for example because it represents a lagged endogenous variable y itÀ1 , the within estimator will also be biased. 4 An alternative method to eliminate the firm-specific effect is to take first differences in panel data:
Under the condition that 4 it is serially uncorrelated, it holds that Ex itÀj Y Á4 it 0 for j ! 2. Hence, explanatory variables lagged two or more periods (or their first differences) are valid instruments for Áx it (Anderson and Hsiao, 1981) . This instrumental variables estimator is consistent for N 3 I and/or T 3 I.
In summary, the case for panel data is strong. For Germany, panel data are available from a variety of sources: (1) balance sheet data from Hoppenstedt/ Germany (Balance Sheet Database) 5 or Primark/United Kingdom (Worldscope Global Researcher); (2) ownership data from Bureau van Dijk/Belgium (Amadeus) or Hoppenstedt (Company Structure Database); 6 (3) board data from former Bayerische Hypotheken-und Vereinsbank (Hypobank Guides) or more recently from Hoppenstedt (Company Structure Database).
Unfortunately, even with panel data two problems remain. First, estimating fixed effects does not explain why there is variation between firms. For corporate governance this could be of particular interest because we want to know which firm-specific arrangements improve performance. The true source of performance improvement can only partly be determined by interpreting within estimators. Second, as argued by Himmelberg et al. (1999) , eliminating firm-specific effects by taking first differences is only appropriate as long as the i are indeed fixed. If the i are not constant over time, this is a problem of missing variables and estimated coefficients will be biased and inconsistent (see Section 4). Therefore, more model structure is required to better understand how corporate governance influences performance. Denis and Sarin (1999) take a first step in this direction by challenging the commonly assumed persistence of ownership structure, showing for the US that firm ownership and the composition of the board of directors exhibit significant intertemporal variance. Changes in ownership are related to management turnover, stock performance, or a takeover threat. Similarly, Ko Èke (2000) shows that ownership structures in large German corporations vary significantly over time, and that major changes in ownership are preceded by poor performance and followed by board turnover and corporate restructuring. Hence, studies examining the relation of ownership and performance should use panel data, both for financial and ownership variables.
But even including all firm-specific variables in panel format does not solve the problem that potentially all firm-specific variables are endogenous. Uncontroversial instruments, crucial for identification, are those that are determined outside the firm and affect the firm. Prime candidates are macroeconomic variables (Nickell and Nicolitsas, 1999) or government regulation (Zingales, 1998; Garvey and Hanka, 1999) . Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999) investigate the impact of increases in financial pressure ± the ratio of interest payments to cash flow ± on company behavior. They find that an increase in financial pressure has a large negative impact on employment, a small negative impact on pay rises and a minute positive impact on productivity. To cope with potential endogeneity of firm-specific financial pressure, Nickell and Nicolitsas apply a set of instruments: long lags on employment, output, wages, and capital stock. For their key financial variable, financial pressure, they make use of substantial exogenous shifts in 5.
Bilanzdatenbank. 6.
Konzernstrukturdatenbank.
ß Verein fu È r Socialpolitik and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2002 interest rates, which have been instituted by government policy over the sample period. Zingales (1998) shows how a change in the regulatory environment can help reveal information about firm processes. Zingales examines the market exit behavior in the US trucking industry following major industry deregulation in 1979 initiated by the Carter administration. Deregulation significantly lowered barriers to entry and allowed for increasing competition that was largely unexpected. Thus capital structure is not likely to have been chosen optimally beforehand. Zingales uses the change in competitive pressure to determine the role of capital structure for the firms' exit behavior. On a set of 889 trucking firms he examines the survival until 1985 with the following probit model:
The variable of interest is the firms' leverage in 1977, i.e. before deregulation.
Other factors potentially influencing the firms' survival are various measures of efficiency X 1977 i . Among these are the level of intangibles (as a fraction of total assets), firm size, and return on sales. Leverage thus should catch any additional effect on survival other than efficiency. Zingales's results indicate that highlyleveraged firms had a reduced chance of survival after deregulation. A reason for this may be that they had to curtail good investments.
Other good examples for the use of changes in regulation are the studies of Garvey and Hanka (1999) who study the impact of US anti-takeover laws on firm leverage, Kang (1998) who studies deregulation in the US textile industry, and Kole and Lehn (1997) who investigate deregulation in the US telecommunication and electric utilities industries. For Germany, the history of deregulation is still short. Only recently the markets for telecommunication and energy were opened to competition. The enactment of the Single European Market in 1992 might represent a useful instrument in panel studies, but only when it occurred as an exogenous shock. Allen et al. (1998) find that its enactment had a major impact on tariffs which in turn drove competition within the European Union.
In the context of dynamic panel data models, an alternative is to use lagged endogenous variables as instruments, provided they meet the conditions for valid instruments (see above). The standard instrumental variables (IV) estimator goes back to Anderson and Hsiao (1981) who use a version of a first-differenced two-stage least squares estimator to estimate a panel data model with a lagged dependent variable. Arellano and Bond (1991) propose a generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator that allows to exploit lags of the dependent variable as well as lags of the explanatory variables as instruments. Moreover, GMM estimators allow the researcher to use lagged values of the endogenous variable as instruments also in non-linear specifications such as the one used by Zingales (1998) . Examples for the use of the GMM technique are the studies of Nickell et al. (1997) and Januszewski et al. (2002) . Januszewski et al. examine the effects of product market competition and corporate governance on productivity growth. Using an unbalanced panel of listed and non-listed German manufacturing firms, they find that productivity growth tends to be higher in more competitive industries, but only for firms with concentrated ownership. Their results concerning the disciplining role of competition is consistent with the findings of Nickell et al. for the United Kingdom. Both studies are good examples how the endogeneity problem can econometrically be addressed without identifying exogenous events.
SAMPLE SELECTIVITY
An econometric issue that empirical researchers might be less familiar with is sample selectivity. To illustrate why this is an important issue consider recent empirical studies on corporate governance. Most of them focus on the largest and ± among them ± the listed companies. These companies are also likely to be the most profitable firms in the market. For example, Morck et al. (1988) , Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) , and Cho (1998) consider firms from Fortune 500 in the US. Most studies on Germany also examine the top-performing firms (e.g., Cable, 1985; Seger, 1997; Edwards and Nibler, 2000; Gorton and Schmid, 2000) . But performance is typically the variable that corporate governance is supposed to influence. Hence, these samples are obviously selected by the endogenous variable. This implies that most studies of corporate governance are likely to have a sample selection bias.
Take the example of management compensation, a governance mechanism which recently attracted increasing attention (Jensen and Murphy, 1990 ). If compensation is tied to performance, managers should become more focused on the respective performance measure. Empirical studies face the problem that data on management compensation are available only for those firms which enacted compensation programs. But these enterprises tend to be wellperforming firms, often listed on the stock exchange. Hence, a selection bias is likely here.
More formally, estimated coefficients are unbiased only if the expectation of the error term given the exogenous variables is zero. In the model y x 4 15 the condition E4jx 0 must be satisfied for to be unbiased. If the sample is not randomly selected, i.e. if the probability for firms being in the sample is correlated with the endogenous variable, this condition does not hold.
To illustrate this, suppose that we have data for y only above a certain threshold y Ã . Here y might represent firm performance and x the concentration of share ownership (Figure 1) .
The true slope coefficient is 1 and is depicted by the dotted line. We see that by excluding lower values of y from the regression ± e.g. below a minimum ß Verein fu È r Socialpolitik and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2002 performance of y Ã ± we systematically exclude residuals that are negative at low values of x. Thus, on average the error term will be positive given low values of x. But this implies a downward bias of for performance values above y Ã (bold lines). More generally, the direction of bias depends on the covariance of x and 4. If we knew E4jx, we could include it in the regression, resulting in unbiased estimates. Hence, sample selectivity is a special case of omitted variables. 7 In particular, if we explain performance by the concentration of ownership, the impact will be underestimated when we use only firms with`high' performance.`Low' performers might not be in the sample because they were too small in size and hence were not required to report financial data. Our estimate with the`high' performers would be misleading because it was not ownership structure which forced the coefficient to be smaller than one, but firm size. The true source of influence on performance would remain unclear.
To our knowledge, all empirical studies on corporate governance in Germany suffer from the econometric problem of selection bias. Table 1 lists the most recent of them and compares the selection criteria applied for sample construction. As can be seen from Table 1 , in almost all cases only public corporations (Aktiengesellschaft) are selected for analysis. In addition, often a size criterion is applied since only the largest stock companies are used (Cable, 1985; Edwards and Nibler, 2000; Gorton and Schmid, 2000) . The studies of Chirinko and Elston (1996) , Seger (1997) , and Wenger and Kaserer (1998) demand yet another criterion: the companies selected must have been continuously traded on the stock exchange, in the case of Chirinko and Elston for 25 years in total. As understandable the selection of large companies might See Maddala (1983) on the econometrics of limited dependent variables.
be ± for example, in the light of publication requirements (and hence availability of sufficient information), which are the strictest for the largest companies ± in general these selection criteria potentially bias estimation results. We try to show this with some intuitive illustrations. Firm behavior influences the probability that a particular firm will be in a sample for corporate governance analysis. If a firm exits its product market, for example due to bankruptcy or a takeover, it will drop out of our sample. If a firm goes public, it will be more likely to be in the data set because we often focus on firms listed on the stock exchange. Hence, both decisions ± market exit and listing ± influence the probability to be in the sample.
The firm's market value is often used as an endogenous variable (e.g., Morck et al., 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990) . But a precondition for this is that a market value for each firm is available. This is fulfilled only for listed firms; non-listed firms must be neglected. If the decision to go public depends on performance, the probability for a firm to be in the sample will be influenced by the endogenous variable. In this case parameters will be biased and inconsistent. Assuming that performance is irrelevant for the listing decision certainly is a strong assumption.
In Germany market capitalization was about 28 per cent of GDP in 1996, while it was 114 per cent in the US (OECD, 1998 ). This simple comparison shows that incentives to go public might be significantly different between countries. Even within Germany only a comparatively small number of companies decided to have their shares traded. Out of 2,300 public corporations (AG) only about 500 were publicly traded. About 400,000 private corporations (GmbH) make the majority of all German corporations (Ko Èke, 2001) . Hence, it is likely that the decision to go public is affected by possibly not observable firm-specific characteristics or institutional arrangements such Table 1 Comparison of criteria for sample selection   Study Sample selection Cable (1985) 48 out of the 100 largest companies in 1970 (only AG) Edwards and Nibler (2000) 158 out of the 200 largest companies in 1992 (mostly AG, a few GmbH) Gorton and Schmid (2000) Two cross-sections:
(1) 88 out of the 100 largest companies in 1974 (only AG) (2) 57 out of the largest companies in 1985 (only AG) Chirinko and Elston (1996) 270 companies (only AG) that were continuously traded on the stock exchange between 1965 Seger (1997 144 companies (only AG) that were continuously traded on the stock exchange between 1990 and 1992 Wenger and Kaserer (1998) 48 companies (only AG) that were continuously traded on the stock exchange between 1973 and 1993
ß Verein fu È r Socialpolitik and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2002 as the strictness of disclosure rules. In turn, the decision on the legal form is likely to be influenced by regulations concerning codetermination (Hopt, 1997) or regulations concerning corporate institutions such as the board of directors (Aufsichtsrat) (Steiner, 1998) . This is a problem if the same variables simultaneously influence performance. Pagano and Ro Èell (1996) suggest that an incentive for listing is a strong need of external funding, for example resulting from good investment opportunities. The probability of being in the sample could be determined as depicted in Figure 2 . Similarly, if investment opportunities of listed firms improve, their market value will rise. In both cases the probability of being in the sample will be higher, when our sampling criterion is top-performing listed firms. Formally, the average correlation between the error term and the exogenous variable is positive. Hence, the impact of ownership concentration will be mismeasured, and probably all the studies shown in Table 1 suffer from this problem.
The study of Holderness and Sheehan (1988) is an example how to appropriately address sample selectivity. For their analysis they use only firms listed either on the NYSE or on AMEX. To check whether there is a selection bias they replicate all estimations on a random sample from all firms in the 1980 Spectrum. 8 Showing that estimation results from both samples are generally the same they conclude that the original sample is not biased.
The firms' decision to exit a market can also bias a sample. Often researchers eliminate firms from their data set for which they do not have a performance history over the whole sample period ± e.g. due to bankruptcy, takeover, or reporting failure ± in order to obtain a balanced panel. However, sampling data only for surviving firms leaves them with the top-or well-performing firms; losers are eliminated. Thus, balanced panels are probably biased. In light of this, the studies of Chirinko and Elston (1996) , Seger (1997) , and Wenger and Kaserer (1998) are likely to suffer from this kind of selection bias. 9 Further selection criteria that might bias a sample are the firm's decision to diversify (Campa and Kedia, 2000) and the decision to announce corporate events such as debt or equity issues (Eckbo et al., 1990; Prabhala, 1997) . The only additional criterion they use is that these firms must be in one of the manuals of Moody's. 9.
For an empirical study on the US see, for example, Murali and Welch (1989) . They require that the firms in their sample existed continuously during the years 1977±81.
A good example that uses an unbalanced panel is the study of Himmelberg et al. (1999) . They collect data for 600 firms from 1982 through 1992. When a firm drops out in a particular year, they keep the performance history of the firm. Nevertheless, sample bias also occurs when the exit decision is determined by the endogenous variable which in their case is firm performance measured by Tobin's q. Himmelberg et al. report that a simple probit model for exit refers to size as the main explanatory variable for exit, not firm failure. They conclude that selection bias is unlikely in their sample.
Economic intuition tells us that exit decisions are probably strongly correlated with corporate governance failure. If a firm exited the market, we would assume that this is important information about the firm. Not using this information means to include it in the error term. Therefore, firm decisions on market exit or listing are important vehicles for identification.
Tests
The above discussion shows that there are two types of selection bias: (1) the sample does not contain a particular type of firm at all (e.g., non-listed corporations or private corporations); (2) the sample contains all relevant firms but suffers from sample attrition (e.g. owing to bankruptcy or takeover). The first type of bias is typically not testable because the sample does not contain any information on the missing firms. We need to rely on economic theory to detect which firms ought to be included in our analysis.
For the second type of bias, Verbeek and Nijman (1992) suggest a number of simple tests. One approach is based on the idea that the error terms should not depend on the selection indicators. Define the indicator variable r it as r it 1 if x it Y y it is observed and zero otherwise. To test that, one includes some function of r i1 Y F F F Y r iT in the model and checks its significance. Verbeek and Nijman recommend to include c i T t1 r it , indicating whether unit i was observed over all periods, or T i T t1 r it , indicating the total number of periods i is observed. Another group of tests is based upon the idea that fixed-or random-effects estimators should suffer differently from selection bias, using either a balanced sub-panel or an unbalanced panel. Verbeek (2000, p. 346) argues that if different samples, selected on the basis of r i1 Y F F F Y r iT , lead to significantly different estimators, it is very likely that the selection process contains information about the unobservables in the model.
Lessons
Analogously to the discussion of tests, we now discuss solutions to selection bias, separately for both types of bias. The first source of bias is best addressed by collecting data on the missing firms. What sounds simple, can in practice be a Herculean task. Whereas a number of databases contain information on large and listed German companies, there are only a few that include balance sheet data on non-listed companies. Among them are Balance Sheet Database from ß Verein fu È r Socialpolitik and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2002 Hoppenstedt and Worldscope Global Researcher from Primark. Although disclosure requirements in essence are the same for listed and non-listed corporations ( §266ff., HGB), they are less strongly enforced for non-listed corporations. Even more difficult to obtain are data on ownership for nonlisted corporations, preferably in panel format. As mentioned above, suitable data sources are the Hypobank Guide and the Company Structure Database from Hoppenstedt, both of which contain information on private (GmbH) and public (AG) non-listed corporations. A major obstacle is, however, that nonlisted firms frequently change their name, which makes it difficult to track them through the full sample period.
The second source of bias can be addressed econometrically. This approach also requires some additional information. To appropriately correct for sample attrition owing to bankruptcy or takeover, one needs information on these events. This implies that the researcher must verify why a particular firm stopped reporting in a particular year. Information about the status of a company (bankruptcy, voluntary liquidation, change in the legal form or the name, etc.) are officially available only from courts (Handelsregister), which are accessible only locally at the place of registration of a particular firm. A more cost-efficient way to obtain this information is to conduct a survey among sampled firms, most simply by telephone. Of course, in case of liquidation without succession this strategy is not going to work.
The classical econometric approach to correct for selection bias goes back to Heckman (1976) . Essentially, we run an expanded regression to model E4jx. Assume that firm performance has a truncated distribution (Figure 3) . The distribution is truncated at y y Ã . No information is available for firms below minimum performance y Ã . Performance is observed conditional on the probability that the particular firm belongs to the sample. If we do not use this information, estimated coefficients will be biased and inconsistent. More 
where x it is an exogenous characteristic and y Ã it is the firm's i performance, which is only observable for firms in the sample. Firm exit is described by
with the following observation rule:
where y it is the firm's actual performance. The binary variable r it indicates firm's survival or takeover. Alternatively, r it could indicate firm's survival or bankruptcy. The correction is done by adding a term ' 4 9z it aÈz it to equation (16) as regressor. This term, also called Heckman's lambda, describes the probability that a particular performance value y it is observed, given performance is above the minimum performance level. Since this ratio is probably endogenous we must explain it using information about firm exit as instrumental variables. Note that a naive application of the Heckman procedure generates problems of its own. Problems may arise because the functional form is wrongly specified, the assumption of a normal distribution does not hold, or some parameters are not identified. Other more recent techniques to deal with selection bias can be found in Verbeek and Nijman (1996) and Vella (1998) .
The main lesson for empirical studies on corporate governance is that we need more firm-specific data that shed light on the sampling process. This is not an easy task since we usually use data that were collected for other purposes and hence are incomplete for our means.
MISSING VARIABLES
A third and probably well-known econometric problem plaguing empirical studies on corporate governance occurs when explanatory variables are missing in the estimated model. This occurs in two forms. First, for reasons of data availability typical in the entire industrial organization research, this literature features a more than normal number of estimated equations in which key explanatory variables are not available for inclusion. Second, knowing little about functional forms, the commonly employed linear specifications imply, if counterfactual, missing higher order terms in the equation that has been estimated.
An interesting example of a frequently missing variable is the intensity of product market competition (Baily and Gersbach, 1995) . For example, more intense competition should increase pressure on management because profits shrink and, in consequence, non-performing managers might get fired (Hart, 1983) . 10 Pressure resulting from high leverage could substitute for pressure from competition (Nickell et al., 1997) . Hence, the interaction between competition and corporate governance mechanisms becomes important.
A prominent example for the second case is again the study of Demsetz and Lehn (1985) . In their model, ownership concentration is supposed to influence the average profit rate. Their specification imposes the restriction that this influence is linear in nature. But this is not consistent with theory. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that managerial ownership should have a positive impact on performance. Fama and Jensen (1983) show that high managerial ownership could make managers too risk-averse. Hence, performance should be lower for high managerial ownership (Managerial-Entrenchment Hypothesis). Demsetz and Lehn's model does not allow for a non-linear influence of ownership. As we know, this could be corrected by using a polynomial, e.g. managerial ownership could enter the regression model in a linear and a quadratic term. In most studies the quadratic and higher order terms are left out, generating a left-out variable bias.
More generally, if the true structure of the model is y x z 4 20
but the regression leaves out the variable z, the OLS estimate of is covxY z varx 21
which is unbiased only if (1) 0 or (2) the covariance of x and z is zero. This textbook analysis generalizes to the multivariate case and may be used to sign the bias and to assess its relevance. Assume that y is the firm's profit, x is managerial ownership, and z measures the intensity of competition. Assume further that higher competition leads to lower profits, i.e. is negative, and that competition reduces agency costs. Then managers can be offered a lower equity share in the firm to align their incentives compared with a situation in 10.
This result is not uncontroversial in the theoretical literature. Scharfstein (1988) shows that Hart's results depend on the extent of managers' assumed risk aversion. In a similar model, but with a different utility function, Scharfstein obtains the opposite result: more competition increases managerial slack. Hermalin (1992) shows that if agency goods are normal goods competition decreases agency costs.
which the firm has substantial market power. This means that covxY z`0. If no measure of competition is included in the regression, the impact of manager's equity on performance will be overestimated. Taking the Demsetz and Lehn (1985) example, we also know the sign of the bias from a priori information. Jensen and Meckling (1976) predict a positive impact of managerial ownership, Fama and Jensen (1983) a negative impact at least for very large managerial stakes. Hence, we can expect an inversely Ushaped relationship. Leaving out the quadratic term will therefore cause the coefficient of the linear ownership variable to be underestimated. Morck et al. (1988) provide evidence for this hypothesis. They regress Tobin's q on managerial ownership using a piecewise linear regression. They find that the relationship is non-linear with turning points at 5 and 25 per cent. Below 5 per cent the slope coefficient is positive, between 5 and 25 per cent negative, and over 25 per cent again positive. McConnell and Servaes (1990) confirm this result using a polynomial specification for managerial ownership. Hence, the result of Demsetz and Lehn (1985) who show that managerial ownership has no significant impact on performance might be due to an incomplete model.
Another difficulty is how a non-linear influence of RHS variables is detected. The way chosen by Morck et al. (1988) is to assume a priori that 5 and 25 per cent represent the break-off points for the piecewise regression model. Since theory does not provide us with this specific kind of information, an econometrically better approach would be to estimate the break-off points themselves.
The general problem is that we do not know which variables are left out. If only one variable is missing in the model ± for example, because we do not have sufficient data on it ± we can predict the direction of bias by using additional assumptions which themselves might not be testable. If more than one variable is omitted, it becomes more difficult to predict the direction of bias (Greene, 1997, p. 402) . For example, if also the firm's leverage has a disciplining effect and is omitted from the model, the covariance of competition and ownership must be predicted, but net of the effect of leverage. Here economic intuition soon becomes unreliable.
This problem is particularly salient because the data requirements for empirical corporate governance analysis are high. As discussed in the introduction, the corporate governance literature enumerates six main different channels how managers can be disciplined. These are: ownership structure (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Grossman and Hart, 1980) ; capital structure (Jensen, 1986; Zwiebel, 1996) ; board structure (Brickley et al., 1988; Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996) ; management compensation (Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Kaplan, 1994a Kaplan, , 1994b , product market competition (Baily and Gersbach, 1995; Nickell et al., 1997) ; and the takeover market (Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Franks and Mayer, 1995) . 11 Let us further exemplify the missing 11.
See Shleifer and Vishny (1997) for an in-depth review of the literature on corporate governance mechanisms. variables problem by discussing specific studies dealing with the influence of ownership on performance. Pound (1988) argues that the quality of monitoring depends on the type of owner. Institutional investors such as banks or insurers might have business relations with the firm they are supposed to monitor, and they do not want to endanger those relations by too harsh monitoring. Hence, private investors might be better monitors. Also institutional investors such as pension funds, which have no business relations with the firm, could be good monitors (Pound, 1988) . Early studies indicate that pension funds have a significant influence on changes of the corporate charter (Gordon and Pound, 1993; Smith, 1996) . 12 A good example on the interaction of different governance mechanisms is the study of McWilliams and Sen (1997) . They investigate whether managerial ownership has a negative effect on the market valuation of anti-takeover amendments of the corporate charter, or whether managerial board membership has a separate effect. In a first step, McWilliams and Sen show that higher managerial ownership is associated with a more negative stock market reaction. But they argue that managers' board membership should have a separate effect on the reaction of the market. In particular, if a manager holds equity and in addition sits on the board, the stock price should fall even more because managers would have much more power in the corporation. Just managerial stock ownership should not matter. Formally, if the probability for board membership is correlated negatively with the market reaction and if this probability is positively correlated with managerial equity, the impact of managerial equity on the market reaction will be underestimated. In other words, if the true impact of managerial ownership on the stock price reaction is zero but a mixed impact of board membership and equity ownership is measured by only using managerial ownership in the model, the true influence of equity ownership cannot be determined. For 265 US firms from 1980 to 1990 they run the following second regression:
Stock Price it 1 Board Shareholdings it 2 Non-director Shareholdings it 4 it 22
While the coefficient 1 remains significantly negative, the coefficient 2 is close to zero. Thus the results from the first regression were misleading: it is not managerial ownership that causes the negative stock market reaction to charter amendments but managers' board membership. Nickell et al. (1997) examine the simultaneous impact of product market competition, capital structure and ownership structure on productivity growth. Using data on 580 UK manufacturing firms from 1982 to 1994, they run the following model:
12.
See Black (1998) , Karpoff (1998) , and del Guercio and Hawkins (1999) for critical surveys.
Shareholder control is defined as the probability that the largest shareholder will win a vote under the assumption that all the other shareholders vote independently (Cubbin and Leech, 1983) . Their measure of competition is the inverse of ex-post rents (profits less capital costs) normalized on value added. Financial pressure is measured by interest payments normalized on cash flow. They find that all three factors improve productivity growth but that shareholder control and financial pressure can substitute for competition. Formally, if competition had been neglected in the model, the impact of shareholder control would have been underestimated because the covariance of shareholder control and competition is negative, and competition itself has a positive influence on productivity growth. Typically, the researcher cannot test for missing variables. As for the case of missing data for a particular type of firm (see Section 3), we must rely on economic theory to detect which variables are missing in a given empirical model.
Lessons
There are several lessons from these empirical studies. First, if theory suggests that particular variables have a non-linear influence on firm performance, the model must include polynomial terms of the relevant variables. Alternatively, piecewise regressions can be run. Forcing variables to have a linear impact can bias the estimated coefficients. Second, the influence of a particular corporate governance mechanism generally will not be measured correctly if other relevant mechanisms are omitted from the model. Coefficients will be biased and inconsistent if governance mechanisms can substitute or complement each other. This is, however, very likely for any firm-specific variable.
We have some clear requirements for data on hand. Earlier studies were limited through data availability. This has changed. The following specific data are required:
•
Ownership data: shareholder type (e.g. managers, non-managing individuals, institutional shareholders, government), size of share blocks. • Financial data: debt structure (e.g. long-term versus short-term, bank versus industry credit, outside versus inside financing).
Board structure: composition of the board (e.g. size, fraction of insiders or bankers, equity positions of board members, union representation).
Competition measures: market power (e.g. number of competitors, industry-specific concentration indices, import penetration).
Takeover activity: number of successful and unsuccessful takeover attempts.
If any of these variables are not used in estimation, a bias in coefficients will be likely. The problem with these requirements is that usually our data had been collected for other means. Therefore, they are often incomplete over time and also do not contain the required details. This can significantly reduce panel size. Sources for some of these data have already been enumerated in Section 2. Regarding data on competition, the researcher typically needs to rely on some ex-post measure, e.g. by using individual market shares as proxies. For Germany, such industry-level competition data are available from the Federal Anti-Trust Commission (Monopolkommission), but mainly for manufacturing industries. Problems of these competition data are discussed in Section 5.
Concerning ownership data on German corporations the situation is better. As noted in Section 2, such data are available in panel format. However, before 1994 these data are available only in print format; only from 1995 on, firms must disclose share stakes exceeding 5 per cent to the public. However, the law on the publication of large holdings (WpHG) leaves much room for firms to circumvent this requirement, and the more recent law on transparency and control (KonTraG) has not significantly improved this situation (Becht and Bo Èhmer, 2002) .
Compared with the United States, data availability on managerial remuneration is much less developed. In an attempt to improve investor relations, the largest German enterprises are starting to disclose voluntarily information on this element of corporate governance Schwalbach, 1997a, 1997b) . Almost prohibitive is the effort to track managers' careers and the history of board structure because only print data are available. A reliable data source on the German supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) seems to be Hypobank Guide.
MEASUREMENT ERROR IN VARIABLES
Measurement error is the fourth in our list of plagues to empirical corporate governance studies. This includes mismeasurement of the endogenous as well as the exogenous variables.
Corporate governance has the purpose to improve firm performance. However, it is not entirely clear how firm performance ought to be measured. Take the example of takeover studies. Economic theory suggests that the market for takeovers can serve as a corporate control device (Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Franks and Mayer, 1995) . If firm value is lower than the expected value that can be achieved under a different management team, this signals that a corporate takeover followed by an exchange of management could improve firm value (Jensen, 1988) . 13 The first empirical problem here is that in
13.
A problem with this argument is that the old management teams could enact the changes themselves. In addition, old management should generally have much better information about the company.
practice the true market value is particularly hard to measure in times of a takeover owing to often erratic variation, and other corporate performance measures are not highly correlated. Measurement error in the endogenous variable does not cause estimated coefficients to be biased because the error term catches this additional variation, but estimation results are likely to be weakened owing to a low ratio of signal-to-noise. The additional variation may lead to insignificant and unusable estimation results. Estimated effects of corporate governance have a larger range of uncertainty than they have in reality.
As opposed to measurement of the endogenous variable, measurement error in exogenous variables causes coefficient estimates to be biased and inconsistent. This is most likely for variables that firms are not required to submit to the public. Competition measures are a good example. In the industrial organization literature, competition is typically measured using individual market shares, rents, 14 price markups, or the elasticity of market demand. But since we cannot observe marginal costs, and prices are only reported jointly with the amount of goods sold (i.e. as sales), we have only vague information on price markups.
More formally, take the simple case with one regressor. Assume that the true regression model is y x Ã 4 and the true x Ã is measured with error #. We observe x x Ã # and measure with covxY y varx covx Ã #Y x Ã 4 varx 24
Expanding the covariance by adding and subtracting # we obtain
if there is noise in the measurement of the exogenous variable x, it follows that
Hence, will be biased towards zero. Estimated effects of mismeasured variables are always smaller in absolute value than they are in reality.
14.
Januszewski et al. (2002) define rents as operating surplus less costs of capital, normalized by total sales.
Note that there are also theoretical problems concerning the abovementioned measures of market power. Even if we knew all participants in a market and their relative market shares, we would neglect the fact that most goods have more or less close substitutes. Moreover, even if we knew all market participants including those of substitutes, we would disregard competitive pressure resulting from the threat of market entry by new suppliers. In this case, public statistics report a too low size of an individual market and hence a too small degree of competition. Corts (1998) argues that a price markup measure is only appropriate if an industry is characterized by a conjectural variations game. This cannot be assumed for all industries. If an industry is characterized by efficient supergame collusion, the conduct parameter method will yield severely downward-biased estimates of market power in that industry. Since this downward bias will not be equal for all industries, measurement error will be even higher. Formally, if competition has a positive influence on firm performance and if competition is measured with some error, the estimated coefficient will be biased towards zero.
Many studies on corporate governance use Tobin's q as the key performance measure (e.g., Morck et al., 1988; Cho, 1998) . Implicitly these studies assume that capital markets know the correct firm value and that it is reflected by current market value of shares. Although it is sometimes doubted that this assumption is correct, it might be the best measure available. Empirical studies on Germany usually use other measures ( Table 2 ). The main reason lies in German accounting rules: in annual accounts, assets are not reported at their market value but at historical costs, i.e. at the value they had at the time of purchase.
If these different performance measures indeed proxied for the same (not directly observable) firm performance, they would be highly correlated. Unfortunately they are not. Geroski (1998) shows for British firms that the (1985) Return on assets Chirinko and Elston (1996) Return on assets Edwards and Nibler (2000) Market-to-book ratio Gorton and Schmid (2000) Return on assets, return on equity US and UK Demsetz and Lehn (1985) , Holderness and Sheehan (1988) Return on equity Morck et al. (1988) , McConnell and Servaes (1990) , Cho (1998) Tobin's q Nickell et al. (1997) , Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999) Productivity growth correlation between different performance measures and some preconditions for profitability, such as the number of major innovations or patents produced, is weak. In addition, even the correlation between performance measures such as accounting profits, market value or the growth rate of market value is low. This is mainly due to differences in distributions of variables. Geroski shows that accounting profits normalized by total sales are almost normally distributed. In contrast, the number of patents produced, a precondition for profitability, is highly skewed. Hence, different measures of performance might be correlated only in a highly non-linear way.
Tests
Hausman (1978) proposes a simple test for measurement error in exogenous variables. This test is based on the idea that instrumental variables can help reduce measurement error. In the above notation, we need to specify one or more instrumental variables that are correlated with the exogenous variable x Ã , which is measured with some error, but are uncorrelated with the error #. Then we estimate the model y x Ã 4 twice, once with and once without instrumental variables, to obtain estimates for IV and , respectively. Under the null hypothesis of no measurement error, the difference of À IV is zero. As Hausman shows, this test statistic is asymptotically 1 2 -distributed.
Lessons
There are several lessons for future research. First, selection of the endogenous variable can strongly influence estimation results. If different performance measures come from different distributions, estimated coefficients will depend on the model we have chosen. Only if our estimates for corporate governance variables are robust against using alternative performance measures, we can be more confident in our results. Robustness checks reduce the dependence on particular assumptions. Second, if exogenous variables are measured with error, the problem is more serious. The direct approach to reduce measurement error is to improve the data on hand. Take the case of ownership data for large German corporations. Since there are several sources for ownership information, the researcher can use these to cross-check the relevant data to detect irregularities. But as discussed above, not only typos introduce measurement error. Also a theoretically wrong measure that is correlated with the correct measure is a mismeasured variable. In case of ownership concentration, owing to complex ownership structures in large German corporations concentration should not be measured at the direct level, but at the ultimate level of ownership (Becht and Bo Èhmer, 2002; Ko Èke, 2000) .
Third, for some types of data there is only one source, hence cross-checks are not possible. In case of industry-level competition, this data source is the Federal Anti-Trust Commission (Monopolkommission), which obtains the raw ß Verein fu È r Socialpolitik and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2002 data from the Federal Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt). These statistics report the number of suppliers and other measures of concentration for fourdigit industries. 15 Even if these data are free from error, the researcher faces the problem to assign these industry-level data to firms, for which he or she typically has information on total sales only, not on sales for all the firm's market segments. The merger of both sources of data unavoidably introduces some error, particularly for the largest firms. To test whether this measurement error influences the estimated impact of competition on performance, the researcher might think of re-estimating the model without the largest firms. However, this approach would create a serious selection problem.
Preferably, we consider additional measures of competition. For product market competition, this can be other industry-level measures such as import penetration, which need to be constructed from the foreign trade statistics (Auûenhandelsstatistik) and the census of production (Produktionsstatistik) provided by the Federal Statistical Office, or firm-level measures such as expost rents, which need to be constructed from balance sheet data. In absence of clear theoretical predictions how these different measures of competition interact, the researcher should experiment using several measures simultaneously in the empirical model and report adequate sensitivity analyses. Alternatively, the researcher chooses one measure and uses alternative measures as instruments to reduce the error in the prime measure.
A different but closely related method to deal with measurement error is the structural factor analysis. 16 This approach explicitly specifies the relation between the unobservable attributes, which are supposed to influence the endogenous variable, and the observable variables. Essentially, these observable variables are used to estimate (unobservable) latent variables, which in turn are applied to explain the endogenous variable of interest. In an analysis on firm's capital structure choice, Titman and Wessels (1988) estimate eight latent variables (such as growth opportunities, firm size and profitability) using 15 observable firm characteristics. In a second step, these latent variables are applied to explain firm's capital structure. This approach is advantageous to simply using several proxy variables simultaneously when an observable firm characteristic influences several of the latent variables. However, for empirical corporate governance studies, which use measures of shareholder influence, creditor influence or supervisory board influence, this overlap is typically nonexistent. This might change when further theoretical work offers more precise hypotheses on the interactions of different governance mechanisms.
15.
Note that these statistics include foreign competitors only then when they are registered at a German court. Therefore, these competition data are likely to be measured with a bias depending on the industry. 16.
We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper serves as a framework or checklist for future empirical corporate governance studies. It fulfills two purposes. First, going through this checklist should clarify where unavoidable problems are and how they can affect estimation and interpretation. Even better, it can prevent biases in the first place. Second, it should raise the awareness for careful data collection, in particular the need for panel data.
Endogeneity of the RHS variables is likely to be the most common problem. It generally occurs in two forms: structural reverse causality and unobserved firm heterogeneity. In both cases, panel data are a necessary condition to solve the endogeneity problem. With panel data on hand, fixed-effects models or models in first differences can be estimated to take into account the unobserved part of firm heterogeneity. But this approach fails if unobserved heterogeneity is not constant over time. What must be done is to reduce the unobserved part of the model by including other firm-specific variables. One econometric trick is to use long lags of RHS firm-specific variables. But these might be weak instruments; thus the crucial task to resolve structural reverse causality is the search for uncontroversial instruments.
Sample selectivity is the second source of potential estimation bias. To avoid sampling bias the researcher must take into account major firm decisions such as the decision to go public or to exit a product market. This is accomplished by extending the samples to non-listed firms, potentially of various sizes, and by not dropping observations of firms that exited the market. In a second step, information about market exit must enter the regression model.
The problem of missing variables must be avoided by including all theoretically relevant governance mechanisms in the empirical model. Hence, specific data are required on ownership structure, debt structure, board structure, product market competition, and possibly past takeover activity. Since economic theory suggests that some of these variables might have a nonlinear influence on performance, higher order polynomial terms are required.
Last but not least, measurement error in variables can bias estimation results. Measurement error in exogenous variables clearly biases estimated coefficients. Unfortunately this is likely to be the case for particular variables often used in corporate governance analysis, e.g. measures of competition or ownership. There is no simple solution to this problem. One way to reduce measurement error is to instrument the variables measured with error appropriately; however, such instruments are difficult to find. Another is to check the robustness of estimation results using alternative measures of the relevant firm characteristic. This also applies to the endogenous variable, although measurement error in this variable does not bias estimated coefficients. Previous empirical studies appear to follow this route because many different measures of performance are used. What they often fail to do, however, is to state clearly the assumptions on which their measures were selected. This is not a formalism: many empirical contradictions could be dissolved if models were compared on an equal basis.
